This research lacuna is at least partly due to data limitations. However, the 'Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS)', which are based on large samples of Germans and Turks, offer new and unique opportunities for the systematic study of the relationship between Muslim religiosity and gender equality: They provide information on both groups' individual levels of religiosity as well as on gender attitudes and behaviors, i.e. individuals' approval of gender equality as well as more practical features of gender relations such as the way couples share household tasks.
Using these new datasets, we ask to which extent between-and within-group differences in gender-related attitudes and behaviors of Turks and Germans are attributable to differences in religiosity. Both groups vary with respect to many other characteristics known to affect gender equality such as education, female labor force participation, or broader socialization contexts. We thus need to assess the relative extent to which group differences are attributable to degrees and contents of religiosity as compared to other factors. Since it may be expected that exposure to more egalitarian gender values during formative years attenuates the influence of Muslim religiosity, we also need to scrutinize how the nexus between religiosity and gender-related attitudes and behaviors changes in the generational succession among Turkish immigrants.
We start with an overview of theoretical arguments and previous empirical findings on the relationship between religion and gender relations in general and among Muslim migrants in particular. We then present our data and measurements and give a descriptive overview of the distribution of our relevant variables for Germans' and first and second generation Turks'.
Based on this, we present the analysis of how religiosity impacts on gender-related attitudes and behaviors among the groups under consideration. A critical discussion of our findings concludes the article. In the following, we discuss potential hypotheses about the influence of religious traditions and of individual religiosity -broadly understood as the commitment to religious values and norms -as potential factors for subscribing to more traditional gender role orientations and gender related behaviors such as the division of household labor. Doing this, we draw on standard paradigms of secularization and assimilation as well as on alternative theories of religious culture and reactive ethnicity, assess their prima facie plausibility against the background of existing empirical findings on Turkish migrants in Germany, and discuss arguments about religiosity's changing pertinence in the generational succession.
Religion and gender in the context

Religion's impact on gender attitudes and behavior
There are many factors that affect gender attitudes and behavior, including most notably the degree of societal modernization (Inglehart and Norris 2003, p. 47) . Gender attitudes are strongly related to individual social background, with the better educated, female, and younger parts of the population holding more egalitarian attitudes. Gender behavior -e.g. the division of household tasks between men and women, decision making in the household, or couples' money arrangements -is similarly related to partners' resourcefulness such as income differences and life circumstances (Blood and Wolfe 1960, Becker 1981; Treas 1993 Now, standard theories of secularization predict that increasing societal modernization contributes to both a decline in religiosity and a decrease in the practical relevance of religion and, in both ways, facilitates more egalitarian gender relations. Within the context of presumably secularized European societies, it can therefore by hypothesized that migrants from less modernized countries with higher levels of general religiosity exhibit less egalitarian attitudes than those shared by the majority, other things being equal.
The stereotypical argument that Muslim immigrants are ill-equipped to adapt to Western norms of gender equality, however, does not just refer to their strong religiosity.
Rather, it assumes that there are also differences in the content of religiosity. There is indeed a long-standing literature which highlights denominational variations in attitudes toward women's roles and women's socio-economic status and family related behavior (Lenski 1963; Porter and Albert 1977; Heaton and Cornwall 1989) . Islamic discourses and practices such as Quranic scripture and the legal rules of shari'a are in particular perceived to entail inherently non- Turkish migrants most of whom come from rather traditional rural contexts and only rarely hold higher educational degrees, are overall less egalitarian than natives. There is also some preliminary evidence that religiously committed Muslim migrants (but not Christians) are substantially less approving of gender equality than secular ones (for high school students see Brettfeld and Wetzels 2003, p. 331) . At the behavioral level, previous research has shown that higher levels of religiosity are related to less female autonomy in Turkish immigrant households (Nauck 1985) . In sum, however, the existing literature does not reveal to which degree traditional gender attitudes and behaviors among Muslim immigrants are best explained by either their socio-economic background, their degree of religiosity, or by some particular characteristics of Islam.
Religion and gender among second generation immigrants
We now turn to the implications of straight-line theories of secularization and assimilation for the role of religion and gender among second generation migrants. Higher levels of education and labor force participation are usually connected to lower levels of religiosity (van Tubergen However, theories of secularization and assimilation have met considerable criticism.
Thus, it is claimed that depending on the circumstances in the host society, ethnic ties and identities may be maintained or even revitalized among the second generation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, p. 148) . These 'reactive' forms of identity formation may compensate for a lack of social approval and are most likely to emerge in hostile reception contexts marked by discrimination and a lack for upward mobility that create the need for alternative sources of social status and identity. Since religion is an important foundation of ethnicity for many immigrant groups, this should also apply to religious acculturation processes (Greeley 1971). As generational persistence may affect both the strength of religious commitments and their grip on migrants' attitudes and behaviors in other, non-religious spheres, one would hypothesize that the relationship between religiosity and gender-related attitudes and behavior remains strong or becomes even stronger for second generation migrants.
Again, empirical evidence is inconclusive to decide between these two alternative arguments. At first sight, it seems that religiosity is declining in the generational succession, as evinced by data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which show that second generation immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia are less religious than first generation migrants in terms of indicators such as religion's subjective importance or attendance of religious services (Frick 2004; Diehl and Schnell 2006) . However, it is not clear to which extent these changes are merely due to differences in group composition (e.g. age and education). In fact, one might well expect that Turkish migrants in Germany follow patterns of 'reactive ethnicity' or at least 'ethnic maintenance' rather than of straight-line assimilation since they face larger social and cultural distances than other groups of labor migrants such as Italians or Greeks. Although second generation Turks in Germany have higher levels of education and labor force participation and more contacts with natives than the first generation, their structural, cognitive, and social assimilation progresses slower than that of other labor migrants (Kalter and Granato 2002; Diehl and Schnell 2006) and they remain subject to negative stereotypes (Wasmer and Koch 2003) . This may slow down acculturation processes and further the maintenance or even reactivation of ethnic and religious identifications and norms.
Moreover, there is evidence that migrant parents feel a greater need to put more effort in the maintenance of cultural heritage than non-migrants. Intergenerational continuity in the transmission of religious norms within Turkish families is indeed high, particularly in the relationship between fathers and sons (Nauck 1995; . Existing findings also reveal that children of immigrant-parents with religious socialization goals hold more conservative gender role orientations than children who were raised in a more secular socialization climate. Again, this applies particularly to father-son dyads (Idema and Phalet 2007). Empirical research on generational change on the behavioral level is so far limited to qualitative studies which suggest that religion has indeed changed its meaning for second generation Muslim migrants.
Supposedly, Turkish women who grew up in Germany, not unlike young urban female Muslims in Turkey (Göle 1996), draw a sharp line between religious and traditional norms and rules and consider the former as a source of identity and emancipation rather than of oppression. 'NeoMuslimas' tend to choose partners who follow the 'true Islam', and even though gender roles are still far from interchangeable the asymmetry in the privileges of the sexes is limited (Nökel 2002, p. 251) . There is no evidence, however, about the quantitative relevance of this group.
This brief outline shows that existing empirical evidence cannot settle the contradictory theoretical assumptions about the role of religiosity in explaining gender role orientations and 
Data and measurements
The 'Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS)' were conducted in 2005 and 2006 at the German Federal Institute for Population Research. In two separate surveys, 10.000 Germans and 4.000
Turks in the age group between 18 and 79 were interviewed on topics such as relationships with partners, parents, and children, gender role orientations and family life, religious attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics. The survey instrument was the same for both groups, except for some additional questions on migrants' immigration history and their individual integration (for data and methods see Ruckdeschel et al. 2006; Ette et al. 2007 ). In the German sample respondents were identified by random route; the survey of Turks was based on a probability sample from the local registration offices. Accordingly, only Turkish citizens were interviewed. Christian and Islamic traditions and, as our data show, it is also less important for Muslim women than for men. To measure strong religious commitment, we therefore used a composite index that takes group specific manifestations of religiosity into account. Thus, we code all those respondents as 'religious' who display strong religious commitments according to at least two of the three indicators mentioned above (attendance of religious services at least once a week; agreement that religious ceremonies are important; religion mentioned as one of the three most important socialization goals out of a list of eleven).
As outlined above, relevant social background variables need to be taken into account when assessing the relative impact of religion on gender-related attitudes and behavior. Age, sex, and family status (married or cohabiting with partner versus living alone) are thus included in the analyses. As indicators for respondents' resourcefulness individual level variables such as education (CASMIN classification, recoded into low for those who completed no school or basic education versus high for all others) (4), employment status (full/part time employment or unemployment versus not employed or retired), and the presence of children are added.
Additional indicators for partner's resourcefulness on the household level are the age differences between the partners (female more than three years younger than male versus female 
Empirical findings
We start out with a descriptive overview of the different variables for first and second generation Turks and Germans. We then take a closer look at the relationship between religiosity, nationality, and generation. Against this background, we scrutinize the role of religiosity in explaining between-and within-group difference in gender-related attitudes and behavior of German and first and second generation Turks.
Gender, religion, and socio-structural background characteristics: A descriptive overview
The three groups differ substantially in terms of the characteristics under consideration. In accordance with much of the existing literature, we find that first generation Turks approve of gender equality less often and are less likely to practice an egalitarian division of household tasks than Germans. Second generation Turks are right in between Germans and Turkish immigrants with respect to the attitudinal aspects of gender equality while on the behavioral level the dividing line is still between first and second generation Turks and Germans (see table   1 ). The three groups also differ in terms of our most important independent variable, religion.
Analyses is also larger among second generation migrants. 
Generational change in migrants' religiosity
Before turning to the impact of religiosity on gender roles attitudes and gender equality, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at generational change in migrants' religious orientations.
While bivariate results suggested that there is generational change in religiosity figure 1 reveals that this is exclusively due to the different age composition of first and second generation migrants. If this is taken into account, second generation migrants are about as religious as first generation migrants.
Figure 1: Gross and net differences in religiosity between first and second generation Turks and Germans (odds ratios)
Separate analyses for males and females not presented here show that second generation Turkish men are even slightly more religious than first generation males whereas second generation women are slightly (though not significantly) less religious than female immigrants.
Moreover, while the difference between first and second generation Turks disappears after controlling for the demographic composition of the groups, the one between Turks and Germans becomes larger. If Germans were as young and male as first generation Turks, they would be even less religious than they already are. Additional controls for education do not change the picture substantially.
In sum, our findings show that contrary to assumptions of straight-line theories of assimilation and secularization, religiosity does not decline in the generational succession, at least not when the share of those with strong religious commitments is considered. On the other hand, popular statements about a religious revival among second generation migrants are also without empirical evidence.
Religion and the approval of gender equality
As already discussed, second generation Turks are more approving of gender equality than first generation Turks but still less approving than Germans. But to what extent do these differences merely reflect group variation in relevant individual background variables? And in how far are The models confirm, first, that Turkish immigrants and, to a lesser degree, second generation Turks hold substantially more conservative gender role attitudes than Germans even after controlling for individual background variables known to affect these orientations. Furthermore,
we can see in model II that religiosity has a rather strong negative impact on the approval of gender equality. However, results also show that group differences in the approval of gender equality remain fairly stable when religiosity is included. Obviously, it is only to a very small extent that the nationality gap shown in model I can be attributed to migrants' religious commitment.
In order to assess if and to what extent the relationship between religiosity and traditional gender role orientations is stronger for Muslim as compared to Christian believers and for first as compared to second generation Turks we insert interactions between religiosity and generation/nationality (dummy variables for religious and non-religious first and second Turks and Germans) into model III. Results show very clearly that religiosity has a negative impact on the approval of gender equality for all three groups -albeit the overall lower level of approval is lower among Turks in general: religious Germans are still more approving of gender Separate models for first and second generation Turks and for Germans provide more detailed insight into the relative importance of the factors under consideration here. For the Turkish group, these models also allow us to look into the role of social contacts with majority members who on average hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes. Results show some substantial similarities between the groups (see table 2 ). As we have already seen, the role of strong religious beliefs reduces the likelihood to approve of gender equality for each group.
Furthermore, being female and better educated comes along with more egalitarian gender role orientations for all three groups. This is especially the case for second generation Turks and for
Germans. However, only Turks hold more conservative gender role attitudes when they are married or cohabiting and have children. As expected, those Turks who speak German most of the time are more likely to approve of gender equality (5).
In general, the attitudes of first generation Turks seem to be more 'diffuse', i.e. less explicable by the variables under consideration here (see low model fit). This suggests that unobserved heterogeneity with regard to factors related to the country of origin, e.g. urban versus rural background, might play an important role for this group.
Religion and gender-related behavior
We now turn to the impact of religion on gender-related behavior. Here, we limit our analyses to cohabiting and/or married couples and look into the factors that influence how they divide the tasks in the household. Apart from that, we run similar models to the ones presented in the last section.
Table 3: Non-traditional division of household tasks (logistic regression coefficients)
The models displayed in table 3 show that Germans are much more likely to share household tasks in an egalitarian manner than Turks, whereas there is no significant difference between to the fact that both first and second generation Turks included in the analyses on the household level are a somewhat selective subsample. As we already saw in the previous section, Turks who are married or cohabiting are considerably more conservative than singles whereas the difference between married and single Germans is very small. Accordingly, if this selectivity in the subsample considered here was taken into account, the differences between Germans and Turks would most likely diminish whereas the ones between first and second generation would remain rather stable.
The model including religiosity shows once more that the differences between Turks and Germans are only marginally attributable to differences in both groups' level of religiosity (see rather stable group coefficients in model II as compared to model I). The group interactions that we added in model III reveal an important difference between gender-related attitudes and behavior: Religious commitments seem to come along with a traditional division of household tasks only for Turks but less so for Germans (the dummy-coefficients for religious and secular
Germans are rather similar in model III). Furthermore, we can see that the absence of generational change in gender-related behavior is mostly due to the fact that second generation religious Turks are just as conservative with regard to their gender-related behavior than first generation religious Turks while there is at least some generational change for secular second generation Turks.
Again, we present separate models (IV to VIII) in order to assess the relative importance of the factors under consideration here for all three groups and look into the impact of migrants' exposure to natives' overall more egalitarian gender norms. These models confirm that religion is negatively related to an egalitarian division of household tasks only for Turks, not for Germans. Religious Turks of both generations are less likely to pursue an egalitarian division of labor in their household than secular Turks. And again, the influence of religiosity seems to be just as strong for second than for first generation Turks (6). The impact of religion for second generation migrants is moderated if respondents' social context is taken into account: Obviously, 'cultural' factors such as religious commitments or gender role orientations matter more for Turks than for natives whose gender division of labor seems to hinge primarily on factors not considered here (see low model fit for this group) (7).
Conclusion
In this article, we have asked to what extent between-and within-group differences of Germans and first and second generation Turks in gender attitudes and behavior can be attributed to religious commitment. In sum, our analyses establish four key findings. First of all, whereas previous research has described the assimilation process of Turkish migrants in Germany as comparatively slow but steady, their religiosity seems to be rather stable across the generations.
This applies at least to immigrants with strong religious commitments -who are a minority even within the Turkish population -and particularly to young Turkish males.
Secondly, our findings suggest that religious individuals hold more conservative gender role attitudes than more secular ones among both Turks and Germans -even if relevant social background characteristics are taken into account. However, strong religious commitments do not affect the division of household tasks among German couples, while this continues to be the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Fourthly, despite religiosity's moderate role in explaining gender-related differences between Turks and Germans our analyses show that strong religious commitments contribute to generational stability in attitudinal and behavioral gender-traditionalism. Only secular second generation migrants hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes than first generation migrants, and generational change in gender-related behavior -albeit small -is also limited to secular Turks. Strong religiosity, or so our analyses suggest, seems to be an effective barrier to generational change towards gender equality in attitudes and in everyday life among Turkish migrants.
It has to be emphasized that our findings cannot be generalized to the whole Turkish origin population living in Germany. Since naturalized Turks who are often less religious are not included in our analyses, the overall level of religiosity for the Turkish origin population Notwithstanding these reservations, the baseline of our argument is rather clear-cut:
Religious commitment has considerable influence on gender attitudes of all groups considered here, whereas it has repercussions on everyday behavior only for the Turkish population. These findings are in accordance with decades of research showing that the religious factor matters in the sphere of gender relationships. With regard to the role of Islam in explaining the more conservative gender attitudes and behaviors of Turks as compared to natives, however, our findings call for a revision of popular and easy-at hand attributions: The large attitudinal and behavioral differences even between secular Turks and Germans suggest that the factual explanatory power of migrants' religiosity lags far behind its prominence in public debates.
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Notes
(1) Although naturalized Turks were included in the German sample, they were strongly underrepresented. We therefore had to exclude them from the analyses.
(2) The questionnaires are available under http://www.bib-demographie.de/publikat/frame_material.html.
(3) The four GES items are: 1) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women (agree coded low); 2) When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (agree coded low); 3) Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary (agree coded low); 4) If a woman wants a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove? (disapprove coded low). The fifth item was not in the original (5) Note, however, that it is impossible to assess the causal relationship between migrants' social assimilation and their adoption of liberal gender attitudes with cross-sectional data.
(6) The statistically non-significant coefficients (p=.9) for the second generation are primarily due to the small number of cases for this group. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
